TURKEY’S
FAILED COUP : A WARNING SHOT
AND
PRESIDENT ERDOGAN’S CHOICES : BY
BRIGADIER AJIT NAIR (RETD)
The failed coup has
sent a clear message to the Turkish establishment and to Erdogan in particular.
That he must mend his autocratic ways, curb Police excesses and reign in the
gradual Islamisation of the Country. And that the Army is restive and it will
not tolerate any deviation from the Country’s basic Constitution. But Erdogan
is a feisty customer and it’s a moot point whether he will heed the warning.
Erdogan has ascribed the coup’s failure as a victory for the people and to his
control over the Army – the fact that only a small fraction of the Army
participated. That may well be true, but given Turkey’s turbulent history of
the last 60 years or so, that’s no
guarantee that the next coup will not succeed. Military coups do not need the
people’s support, although that helps; and all other Parties and their
supporters are bitterly opposed to Erdogan, the mutual stand and apparent
agreement in Parliament of Saturday notwithstanding. Erdogan has severely
restricted the powers of the Military by legislative action over the last few
years and controlled the Generals, but past events have shown that coups can
emanate at a relatively junior level.
Turkey was created by a General, after a
violent uprising. And that explains the Army’s pre-eminent status ever since. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk proved
his mettle during the First World War and led his Country to Independence in
1922 and became its first President. His vision was of a Democratic and Secular
Nation and he de facto appointed the Army to be the custodian of these values.
The Army has taken this role very seriously indeed. Opting to stay out of
politics but watching over political actions and their effect on the people.
Whenever they felt that the mandate of the Founding Father was being violated,
they stepped in with a military coup –
but quickly handed power back to the politicians. Erdogan was the first PM to
whittle away this pre-eminence, albeit only in his second term.
The Army and the Courts who interpret the
Constitution, have resisted the slightest effort by politicians to even give an
Islamic flavour to the Country. A classic example is that most ubiquitous
though harmless symbol of Islam – the Head Scarf for women. Turkey has banned
the head scarf in Public life and women may not wear it in any public office,
in schools, hospitals or in the Courts. Any woman wearing a head scarf will not
be employed by the Govt or any Public or private institution. France and Mexico too have banned the head scarf. But Turkey, though
a secular country, has over 95% Muslims. It has resulted in a clash between
those favouring the secular principles of the state, such as the Turkish Armed
Forces, who form a minority of the population, and religious conservatives as
well as Islamists, who form a majority of the population. And who form the majority
of Erdogan’s supporters. Erdogan tried his best to remove the ban.
When Erdogan wanted to install Abdullah Gul in 2007 as President,
the Army objected, because his wife wore the head scarf. Erdogan was confident
enough to hold a private meeting with the Chief of Staff, and to go ahead with
his nomination. But the Military Top Brass refused to attend any Ceremony
presided over by Abdullah Gul, because his wife wore a head scarf. On February
7, 2008, the Turkish Parliament passed an amendment to the constitution,
allowing women to wear the headscarf in Turkish universities, arguing that many
women would not seek an education if they could not wear the head scarf. A
reasonable argument. But Turkey's Constitutional Court annulled the Parliament's
amendment, ruling that removing the ban was against the founding principles of
the Constitution. Which may well be Erdogan’s angst against Judges. And clearly
shows the Army’s almost fanatical support for Secularism.
Previous Coups. Through Erdogan’s fog this much
seems clear: More than 35 years after the last coup, and almost two decades
after the 1997 military intervention, the fight between Secularism and Islamism
rages on. The first Coup – in 1960 was staged on grounds of socio-political and
economic problems – and for Bloc loyalties. The Govt was broke and wanted
Russian assistance and the Coup leaders wanted to remain in NATO/CENTO. The
second Coup in 1971 was on political instability and was action-less. The Army
issued a Memorandum, akin to an Ultimatum – reform or else....The Govt
resigned, but the Army, reluctant to take over overtly, directed from behind
the scene, with the Legislature still functioning. The third Coup in 1980 was mainly
because of economic problems and partly political. There was widespread arrests
and incarcerations, torture and missing people. The Constitution was
re-written. The last Coup was in 1997 – actually another Memorandum. This was
directed against the Islamist prime minister Necmettin
Erbakan of the Welfare Party, of which Erdogan was a member and serving as the
Mayor of Istanbul. In 1998, the Welfare Party was banned by the Constitutional
court and Erdogan jailed and banned from politics for five years. These events
led him to deeply resent the Army and the Courts.
Why did this current Coup collapse so quickly?
Firstly, the Coup was extremely poorly organised. Even with tanks, attack
helicopters and fighter aircraft, it collapsed within six hours !! Without any major
opposition from organised security forces, either Army or Police. There was no
attempt to shut down the major civil TV stations, no attempt to arrest the
civilian leadership, including Erdogan. The Coup looks extremely contrived. They
tried too little and gave up too fast. While Erdogan accused Fethullah Gulen of
master-minding or actively assisting the Coup, Gulen promptly counter accused
Erdogan of staging a “fake” Coup. With a lot of plausibility. If a litmus test
of ‘who did the failed coup serve’ is applied – Erdogan seems the more likely
of the two. The New York Times says this about the Coup – “As coups go, the Turkish effort was
a study in ineptitude: No serious attempt to capture or muzzle the existing
political leadership, no leader ready to step in, no communication strategy (or
even awareness of social media), no ability to mobilize a critical mass within
either the armed forces or society. In their place a platoon of hapless
soldiers on a bridge over the Bosporus in Istanbul and the apparently
uncoordinated targeting of a few government buildings in Ankara.”
The
Gulen factor. Fethullah Gulen is a Green Card holding,
moderate Turkish cleric who lives in voluntary exile in Pennsylvania US, since
1998. He leads from exile
a popular movement called Hizmet – "a moderate,
pro-Western brand of Sunni Islam that appeals to many well-educated and
professional Turks" according to CNN. For decades he was a close confidant of President Erdogan and was one of
the key factors in Erdogan’s AK Party winning three elections – in 2001, 2006
and 2011. They fell out in 2013 on issues of corruption. "As someone who suffered under multiple military coups during
the past five decades, it is especially insulting to be accused of having any link
to such an attempt. I categorically deny such accusations," Gulen said. In
an interview with CNN at the time, a top official from Erdogan's ruling AKP
party called the Gulen movement a "fifth column" that had infiltrated
the Turkish Military, police force and judiciary. Says writer Ahmet Sik who
wrote the book "The Imam's Army," which took a critical look at the
Gulen movement "On the one side, there is the Gulen
community, a dark and opaque power that can damage the most powerful
administration in Turkish history. And on the other side, you have an
administration that under the guise of fighting this community can and has
suspended all legal and democratic principles."
Erdogan’s
AKP is the second Islamic oriented Party in power, after Erbakan of the Welfare Party was forced to resign. So Erdogan was extremely circumspect in his first
tenure. His confidence grew with his second tenure and he began to meddle in
promotion policy and retribution against the Army. In 2007, when his choice of
President was resented by the Army, he didn’t acquiesce. Instead he held a
closed door meeting with the Chief of Staff and went ahead anyway. In his third
tenure, Erdogan was a confident PM and he took on the Generals. He even
convened a trial in 2012 of the Generals who conducted the 1997 coup. He curbed
Press freedom, was against Jews and Christians, against alcohol, reformed
Labour Laws and considerably improved the economy, brought inflation down and
reduced the CAD and foreign debt. Turkey’s economy became debt-free and Erdogan
felt he had the political freedom to Islamise the Country further. And his
authoritarianism grew. But in the last three years, Turkey’s economy has taken
a dramatic downturn for the worse. In the 2013 Gezi
Park protests against the perceived authoritarianism of Erdogan and his
policies, starting from a small sit-in in Istanbul in defence of a City park. After the police's intense reaction with tear
gas, the protests grew each day. Faced by the largest mass protest in a decade,
Erdogan made this controversial remark in a televised speech: "The police
were there yesterday, they are there today, and they will be there
tomorrow." After weeks of clashes in the streets of Istanbul, his
government at first apologized to the protestors and called for a plebiscite,
but then ordered a crackdown on the protesters. The stage was set for Military
intervention.
Erdogan’s Choices
Erdogan’s first choice,
which he’s implementing speedily, is to use the failed coup as a means to
consolidate his position, curb press and other freedoms further, and become even more Autocratic. He has accepted the failed coup as a blank
cheque to arrest anybody he feels like, in a virtual witch hunt, without any
reasonable cause. His statement “They will pay a heavy price for
this. This uprising is a gift from God to us because this will be a reason to
cleanse our Army”
is extremely telling. His sacking or arrest of over 2750 Judges, about 20% of
Turkey’s Judiciary is baffling. How were the Judges involved in the coup? His
arrest of thousands of military and Police officers is fraught with danger.
This includes two of his three Field Army Commanders – of the 2nd
and 3rd Field Armies. The Commander of the 1st Field Army
was promoted to Army Chief. No Army will accept the public humiliation of its
officers, especially the seniormost ones lightly. Proclamations by both the
President and PM of the loyalty and courage of the rest of its Army is unlikely
to assuage the tensions within. Erdogan has shrewdly asked the people to remain
on the streets for the next one week. He obviously fears a second coup to
finish the incomplete and botched job.
Turkish
politics and society have been extremely polarised and the failed coup is a signal for Erdogan to
be more inclusive and democratic. He has to eschew his authoritarian tendencies
and rely more on Institutions. His grandiose plans like shifting into the 'Ak Saray' Presidential Palace, one of the
largest in the world and to cut down all the trees in the Gezi Park and build a
grand mosque, which sparked off the protests, have severely dented his
popularity and image. The Kemalists (which includes the Military) and the
secular liberals need to be taken on board, or at least placated. A successful
coup could well be a disaster for Turkey, throwing the Country into turbulent
strife – between the Islamists and the rest – an unwinnable war for both and
something the World least needs in this already troubled region. Turkey can yet
prove that it is the model of a democratic Islamic State. The question is –
does Erdogan have the Statesmanship to do it?